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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
MARK GRAHAM,
Petitioner,

Case No. 2000 0042

vs.

:

UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD,
Respondent

Priority No 14
:

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
MARK GRAHAM

AN APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF
THE UTAH AIR QUALITY BOARD
(Case Below No. 9903004)
Appellant, Mark Graham by and through counsel of record, submits
the following REPLY Brief of Appellant in further support of his petition for
review of a decision by the Utah Air Quality Board (the "Air Board") to
deny him the right to intervene in formal proceeding to resolve a notice of
violation ("NOV") issued against Wasatch Energy Systems ("WES"), a
dioxin-emitting facility in Mr. Graham's neighborhood:

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9 (1996):
(i) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene in
a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who
wishes to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The
petition shall include:
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number;
(b) the name of the proceeding;
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative
proceeding, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under
any provision of law; and
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeksfromthe agency.
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he [sic]
determines that:
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding; and
(b) the interests ofjustice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by
allowing the intervention.

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In late August 2000, essentially a year after he filed a petition to
intervene in the WES Matter,1 Mr. Graham movedfromthe State of Utah.
This fact does not alter the present inquiry. Standing, and by analogy,
intervention, is determined at the time the litigation is commenced. For
example, Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 743 P.2d 1166
(Utah 1987) (where case moot, although capable of repetition, plaintiffs did
not "lose" standing); Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
Services.

U.S.

, 120 S.Ct. 693,145 L.Ed. 2d 610 (2000) (standing

determined at the time the complaint was filed). Therefore, the
determination before this Court remains whether Mr. Graham had the right
to intervene in the WES matter on September 15,1999, the time he filed his
petition.
As the Utah Supreme Court has made clear, standing is determined at
the time a case is filed. Thus, in Bullock, the Court determined that the
Society of Professional Journalists could challenge a district court order
closing a competency proceeding to the public and sealing a related
transcript and memorandum on the basis of the "capable of repetition by

1

In the Matter of: Davis Country Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery
Special Service District d/b/a Wasatch Energy Systems (No. 99030004)

3

evading review" doctrine. Bullock at 1169 (in cases involving pretrial
proceedings, that there will not be sufficient time for appellate court to
intervene justifies an exception to the mootness doctrine). The Court did
this even though the competency proceeding had concluded. Therefore, to
address the Society's challenge, the Court clearly had found that the Society
had standing at the time the case was filed - before the competency
proceeding had concluded. Indeed, if standing were not fixed at the time of
the commencement of action, no exception to the mootness doctrine could
exist - otherwise, plaintiff would always "lose" standing when she "lost" her
case to mootness and the Court would lose jurisdiction over the case. See
also Laidlaw.

U.S.

, 120 S.Ct. 693, 708-09,145 L.Ed. 2d 610, 632

(the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness could
not exist if standing were not fixed at the commencement of litigation).
By analogy, the facts establishing whether Mr. Graham had the right
to intervene in the WES matter were fixed as of September 1999. As a
result, all the allegations regarding his substantial legal interests in the WES
matter remain fixed and are not dependent on where he now lives.2

2

In addition, Mr. Graham states that, if granted intervention, he will participate in the
administrative proceeding. In the alternative, Families Against Incinerator Risk, which
brought a federal case jointly with Mr. Graham to challenge the WES Incinerator's illegal
emissions under the Clean Air Act and of which Mr. Graham is a member, would
substitute itself for Mr. Graham during the proceeding.

4

Finally, to refuse to address this matter on the basis of Mr. Graham's
relocation would be to reward the Air Board for its delay tactics and its
frustration of justice. Already, one year has passed since Mr. Graham
petitioned it for the right to intervene in the WES matter. During this period,
the Air Board has filed two motions, each of which delayed Mr. Graham's
petition for review and each of which was rejected soundly by this Court.
However, the Air Board's own attempts to delay this petition for
review should not serve as the basis for a dismissal of the action. As the
Utah Supreme Court has determined, it could not give an agency incentives
to cut off a petition to intervene. Millard County v. Utah State Tax
Commission. 823 P.2d 459,461 (Utah 1991). Thus, in determining whether
a settlement would moot a petition to intervene, the Court reasoned that
[t]o allow a settlement between parties to moot an extant appeal
concerning intervention of right might well provide incentives for
settlement that would run contrary to the interests ofjustice.
Id at 461, quoting Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Jennings. 816 F.2d
1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1987). Similarly, this Court should not allow the Air
Board to "circumvent the statutory right of intervention" by delaying Mr.
Graham's petition for review with repeated motions made without basis. Id.
at 462. To do otherwise would allow the Air Board to "deal with such

5

motions [to intervene] in a fashion that undermines the purpose of the
statutory scheme for intervention." Id.3
In sum, that Mr. Graham has left Utah does not alter the present
inquiry - whether Mr. Graham established the basis to intervene in the WES
matter as of September 15,1999. Intervention is established at the time the
petition is made. In the present case, as further established below, because
Mr. Graham so clearly had a right to intervene in the WES matter when he
made his petition, he is entitled to a determination of that right.

RESPONSE TO AIR BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
The focus of the Air Board's statement of facts illustrates quite clearly
its misapplication of the standard for intervention. Hoping to justify its
denial of Mr. Graham's petition to intervene, the Air Board centers on two
aspects of the record it believes to be telling: 1) that Mr. Graham failed to
allege facts to show that emissions from the WES Incinerator affected his
health and the environment; and, 2) that Mr. Graham failed to demonstrate

3

In addition, under Cache County v. Property Tax Division of Utah State Tax
Commission. 922 P.2d 758, 766 (Utah 1996), Utah Courts will resolve a theoretically
moot issue "due to its continuing controversy." Because under the Air Board's current
policy toward intervention no member of public could intervene in a formal adjudication
before the Board, the issue before this Court is of continuing controversy and should
therefore be addressed squarely.

6

that his interests in the WES matter were somehow different than those of
the general public. Importantly, the Air Board's characterization of the facts
is misguided for two reasons. First, Mr. Graham did allege facts sufficient
to show that his "legal interests" would be "substantially affected by the
formal adjudicative proceeding," Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9, and he
specifically need not show harm to his health and the environment. Second,
although Mr. Graham is not required to do so, he did distinguish his interest
in the WES matter from that of the general public.
The gist of the Air Board's attack on the adequacy of the facts
establishing Mr. Graham's right to intervene seems to be based on the
mistaken belief that he must satisfy the "injury in fact" prong of the federal
standing requirement. Initially, of course, as Mr. Graham repeats throughout
his opening brief, the proper inquiry in this matter must be whether he meets
the Utah statutory requirement for intervention, not standing. Moreover, to
the extent that the federal standing inquiry is instructive, Mr. Graham has
shown conclusively in his opening brief that he qualifies under every prong
of the three-part "or" test relevant to determining standing under Article V
of the Utah Constitution. 1S'eeBriefofPetitionerat28-37. Finally, even
if it were instructive to the present task, an examination of the federal
"injury in fact" test concludes that Mr. Graham has met this requirement.
7

For example, several federal courts that have recognized that
breathing polluted air is sufficient to confer standing under the Clean Air
Act. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection
Agency. 507 F.2d 905, 910 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding no doubt that plaintiff
will suffer injury if compelled to breathe air less pure than that mandated by
the Clean Air Act); Texans United for a Safe Economy Education Fund v.
Crown Central Petroleum Corp. 207 F.3d 789, 792 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding
that plaintiffs exposed to sulfurous odors while in the home, yard, or driving
through town have suffered injury in fact). Additionally, federal courts have
ruled that living in close proximity to air pollution is, in itself, sufficient to
confer standing under the Clean Air Act. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus. 602
F.Supp. 892 (N.D.CA 1984) (declaration that member lived in close
proximity to specific facilities that emit radionuclides more than adequately
illustrates threat of injury for establishing standing).
Generally, as the United States Supreme Court recently held,
"environmental plaintiffs adequately allege injury in fact when they aver that
they use the affected area and are persons 'for whom the aesthetic and
recreational values of the area will be lessened' by the challenged activity."
Laidlaw,

U.S. at

, 120 S.Ct. at 705,145 L.Ed. 2d at 628, quoting

Sierra Club v. Morton. 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972). Indeed, the Supreme
8

Court explicitly rejected the notion that to establish standing, plaintiffs must
show injury to the environment. Id,

U.S. at

, 120 S.Ct. at 704,145

L.Ed. 2d at 627. Rather, plaintiffs need only show injury to themselves and this injury need not be in the form of verified health risks. Id. Thus, in
the highly relevant context of allegations of excessive discharges of water
pollution, Laidlaw found standing based on affiants' assertions that their
"reasonable concerns about the effects of th[ese] discharges, directly
affected those affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests." Id..
U.S. at

, 120 S.Ct. at 705,145 L.Ed. 2d at 629.

Applying this analysis to the present case, Mr. Graham has plainly
established injury in fact. He stated that he lived in very close proximity of
WES and was thereby exposed to the Incinerator's (allegedly) excessive
emission of dioxin/furan. Furthermore, as in Ruckelshaus. simply by virtue
of living near the Incinerator, Mr. Graham is exposed to and injured by the
relevant pollution. Finally, as plaintiffs in Laidlaw. Mr. Graham stated that
his reasonable concerns regarding the WES Incinerator emissions - that they
adversely impact his health, his garden produce and the ecosystem of the
Great Salt Lake - likewise directly affected his aesthetic and recreational
sensibilities. For example, Record at 7, Tf 4 ("I am concerned about the
effect of air emission from the incinerator on the air quality and on my
9

health"); f 1 0 ("I feel the garbage incinerator facility and its air emission
threaten the Great Salt Lake. I love the Great Salt Lake, and watch birds on
the Lake, which is an important feeding ground for millions of migratory
birds of many varieties").
Mr. Graham's injuries are also "fairly traceable" to WES and its
Incinerator. Mr. Graham has alleged, and the Board did not contest, that "air
emissions from the [WES] facility are carried by the wind . . . to my house
and garden, and to Layton and to the Great Salt Lake." Record at 7, f 6.
Again, as in Ruckelshaus. that dioxin/furans are invisible and do not have an
odor, like radionuclides, does not prevent Mr. Graham from tracing his
injury to the Incinerator.
With regard to its second misunderstanding - that Mr. Graham must
prove that his interests are somehow different from those of the general
public - the Air Board is also off track. Again, the Air Board is applying the
wrong test to the present inquiry. Under the statutory provision, Mr.
Graham is entitled to intervene where he alleges that his "legal interests"
would be "substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceeding."
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9. Plainly, the statute mentions nothing about
requiring petitioners to establish that their legal interests are unique or that
their legal interests are affected in a unique way that distinguishes them from
10

the general public. Moreover, to the extent that it is informative to the
present inquiry, Utah's standing inquiry provides for standing exactly in the
circumstances where the plaintiffs interests are identical to those of the
general public. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry. 716 P.2d
796, 799 (Utah 1986) (if plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she
has standing "if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case
and the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff
has standing to raise the issue"); see, Brief of Petitioner at 32-34. Even
assuming that Mr. Graham's interests are the same as the general public's as
the Air Board suggests, no other petitioner has a greater interest than he
does. Thus, under Terracor. Mr. Graham has standing based on the interests
he alleged to the Air Board in his petition to intervene. Finally, Mr.
Graham's interests are readily distinguished from those of the general public
- inter alia, Mr. Graham lives and eats produce from a garden located 2.5
miles from the incinerator.
In sum, the Air Board's statement of facts exposes its
misunderstanding of the inquiry relevant to determining when a petitioner
has the right to intervene. The Air Board's characterization of the facts also
reveals its mistaken notions of what qualifies as the basis for standing under
Utah and federal constitutional law.
11

Finally, in its statement of facts, the Air Board fails to point out that,
because it did not contest Mr. Graham's assertions or otherwise consider
evidence that counters his statements, the Board must take Mr. Graham's
allegations as true. This is because, as the Air Board oft repeats, this is an
on the record case, and the Board did not consider any evidence that
counters Mr. Graham's assertions. Rather, the approach the Board adopted
was one that was based on accepting Mr. Graham's allegations as true, while
still denying him the right to intervene. Because the alleged facts establish
Mr. Graham's right to intervene, the Air Board's denial of that right is an
erroneous interpretation of the law and should be overturned.

ARGUMENT
The Air Board's argument does nothing to alter the conclusion that
Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene in the WES matter. As established in his
opening brief, Mr. Graham is entitled to intervene because he adequately
alleged that his "legal interests" were "substantially affected by the formal
adjudicative proceeding". Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9.
As he previously argued, Mr. Graham is exactly the type of intervenor
the legislature anticipated should be involved in the Board's formal
adjudication. As already argued, the Board's reasoning otherwise 12

particularly that Mr. Graham separate his interests from those of the public is flawed. First, Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-9(2) says nothing about
comparing Mr. Graham's affected interests to the interests of anyone else
and no such comparison is valid. An intervenor need not distinguish her or
his interest from that of the general public.
Second, even under the standards used by the Board, Mr. Graham
qualifies for intervention - his interest in the matter is different and more
substantially affected than the interest of the general public. As Mr. Graham
made clear, he lives but 2 Vi miles from the facility and is therefore "more"
impacted by WES's excessive emissions than all members of the public who
live and/or spend less time further awayfromthe Incinerator. Record at 7.
Mr. Graham not only lives and breathes the air 2.5 milesfromthe WES
facility, but he also eats vegetables, fruit, and herbs that he grows in his
backyard garden 2.5 milesfromthe facility. Record at 7. Again, Mr.
Graham has alleged an interest that he does not necessarily share with the
general public.
Furthermore, as stated in his affidavit, Mr. Graham watches and
appreciates birds on the Great Salt Lake and its tributary streams, important
feeding grounds and rest stops for millions of migratory and resident birds.
Record at 7. Again, Mr. Graham has distinguished his interestsfromthe
13'

general public. This is particularly true if all of Mr. Graham's allegations
are taken in concert - the location of his home, his garden and his concern
regarding the fate of the Great Salt Lake birds. There are few, if any,
individuals in Utah that share all of these interests with Mr. Graham.4
The Air Board's arguments that Mr. Graham does not have standing
to participate in the WES matter are also unpersuasive and do nothing to
undermine the soundness of Mr. Graham's qualifications for standing as
presented in his opening brief. SeeBriefofPetitionerat28-37. As; Mr.
Graham already established, Utah's doctrine of standing is expansive and is
not limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Article III of the
United States Constitution. Terracor v. Utah Board of State Lands &
Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986).
To this end, the Utah Supreme Court has set forth three standards for
determining whether a litigant has standing. See Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d
1145,1150 (Utah 1983). Importantly, if any of these conditions are met, the
litigant must be allowed access to the courts. Id. First, plaintiff has
standing if she or he can demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that

4

The Air Board seems to imply that Mr. Graham must be the "best" intervenor. But this
is an impossible (and unconstitutional) test. Someone who lived 100 feet from the
Incinerator and never left home may not be the best intervenor if someone else lives 50
feet from the Incinerator and never leaves home.

14

gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute."
Terracor, 716 P.2d at 799 (quoting Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d at 1150).
Second, if the plaintiff does not meet the first criterion, he or she has
standing "if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case and
the issues are unlikely to be raised at all unless that particular plaintiff has
standing to raise the issue." Terracor. 716 P.2d at 799. Third, a plaintiff
who meets neither of the above criteria nonetheless has standing "if the
issues are unique and of such great importance that they ought to be decided
in furtherance of the public interest". Id.
As he has already shown, on the basis of his allegations to the Air
Board, Mr. Graham has standing to participate in the WES matter under
each of these standards. As he alleged, Mr. Graham suffered distinct and
palpable injury from WES's emissions. At the very least, Mr. Graham
adequately alleged that his reasonable concerns regarding the effect of the
Incinerator emission on him, his garden and the Great Salt Lake adversely
impacted his aesthetic and recreational sensibilities.
Moreover, it would be difficult to find a plaintiff who had a greater
interest in the WES matter given the cumulative effect of the location of his
home, the exposure of this garden and his concern with and sensitivity for
the Great Salt Lake ecosystem. Indeed, the Air Board completely failed to
15

suggest an individual or type of individual who had more of an interest in
the WES matter than Mr. Graham. The Air Board also failed to note how
the issues relative to a property owner living near the Incinerator would be
addressed should Mr. Graham and his ilk be denied intervention (or
standing).
Finally, Mr. Graham raises unique issues of great public importance.
The polluting of the heavily populated Wasatch Front and the critical Great
Salt Lake ecosystem with deadly carcinogens and the failure of the Air
Board to protect the public health and environment is certainly a matter of
great public importance.

CONCLUSION
Thus, under the standard for intervention and for standing, Mr.
Graham is entitled to participate in open government and agency-decision
making in the manner the Utah Legislature intended when it provided for
intervention in formal agency adjudications. For this reason, the Air Board's

16

decision to deny Mr. Graham's petition to intervene should be overturned,
and Mr. Graham's petition should be granted.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 16th day of October 2000.

JORO WALKER
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
MARK GRAHAM
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 16th day of October 2000,1 mailed a copy
of the above and foregoing pleading, Reply Brief of Petitioner to:
Richard Rathbun
Assistant Attorney General
160 East 300 South Street, 5th Floor
PO Box 140873
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0873
Larry Jenkins, Esq.
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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